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India’s Maritime Diplomacy in South West Indian Ocean:
Evaluating strategic partnerships
Abstract
Being a maritime nation with considerable economic and military power, India has shown
keen interest in demonstrating its role as a major security provider in the IOR. In the
Southwest Indian Ocean too, India has sought to develop a security presence and
strengthen its position by capitalising on its historic ties with the littoral nations of the
region through provision of military training, defence equipment and security advisors.
India’s efforts are mostly directed at making the Indian influence more visible in the
strategic affairs of the region that seem to be clouded by the increasing Chinese forays into
the region.
The paper evaluates the strategic relationships through the maritime dimensions of India’s
engagement with these littoral nations. The intensity of India’s efforts to be seen as an
important maritime security providing power of the region and the response of these
littoral states to India’s call for greater cooperation forms an important thrust of the paper.
The article argues that India’s national security concerns and great power ambitions
manifest itself in India’s engagement in the region. However, greater exploitation of its
strategic ties with Mauritius and Seychelles hold the key for greater maritime strategic
influence in the region.
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Introduction
Geographically, India is a maritime state dominated by the world’s
third-largest ocean, the Indian Ocean. Its influencing position in the
Indian Ocean has mostly determined its maritime policy and ambitions
in the maritime domain. Its archetypal maritime character and vital
geostrategic location are significant twin factors that have nurtured its
maritime ambitions. Also given India’s strategic position on the world
map, any noteworthy initiative of expanding India’s influence without
any major obstacle can be realized only in the maritime domain. Thus,
a section of the Indian elites sees a close association between their
country’s maritime ambitions and its search for great-power status.1
Indian maritime aspirations in the Indian Ocean may be identified as
seeking pre-eminence and leadership in Indian Ocean affairs. India's
maritime diplomacy and aspirations were not realized to the fullest
because of the Indian governments' neglect of the navy as against the
army and air force. Indian strategic thinkers have always considered
the most vital threats to India's security as originating from land,
specifically from the north-west. With the economic liberalization of
the 1990s, India has recorded an impressive annual growth rate of 7-8
per cent during the last 20 years or so. With continued growth, India
has emerged as a key political and economic player at the global level.
This has resulted in a wide expansion of India’s global interests. To
maintain unhindered economic growth, India needs to protect its
overseas trade, investment, and energy flows. Hence, India is
particularly concerned in protecting its sea-lanes of communications
necessary for its energy exports. Thus, India has adopted an active
maritime policy where trade, security, and connectivity have become
the major issues of India's maritime diplomatic goals.
India’s strategic interests in the Southwest Indian Ocean have widened
in recent times as India considers the Indian Ocean Region as its
primary sphere of influence. As such, strategic influence among the
littoral nations of the Southwest Indian Ocean figures crucial to India’s
security interests. The South-West Indian Ocean comprises of the
island nations of Mauritius, Seychelles, and La Reunion. The region is
also called the ‘Latin Quarter’ because of the preponderance of French
spoken in its many island states and territories. The Mozambique
Channel is the major focus of maritime security in the South-West
Indian Ocean as it is the key route for shipping between the Middle
East and the Atlantic Ocean. The Mozambique Channel was once a
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primary trading route between Asia, Europe, and the Americas before
the opening of the Suez Canal. While commercial traffic at recent times
has slowed down, the Mozambique Channel continues to be
strategically important for the eastern coast of Africa. France is the
strongest power in and around the Mozambique Channel with the
island of La Reunion as its territory. It is through this base that the
French navy maintains its strong presence in the western Indian Ocean
and the eastern coast of Africa. In addition, France patrols the
Mozambique Channel and maintains a presence in the exclusive
economic zone around several French islands in the channel through
this base.2
The article analyses the status of India’s strategic partnership with the
island nations of the Southwest Indian Ocean, viz. Mauritius,
Seychelles, and le Reunion. The article evaluates the strategic
relationships through the maritime dimensions of India’s engagement
with these littoral nations. While doing so, it throws light on the
importance of the Southwest Indian Ocean to India’s strategic interests
and the renewed importance given to extending maritime cooperation
in the region. The intensity of India’s efforts to be seen as important
maritime security providing the power of the region and the response
of these littoral states to India’s call for greater cooperation forms an
important thrust of the article. The article essentially develops around
two hypotheses. First, India’s national security concerns and leading
power ambitions drives its engagement in the Southwest Indian Ocean.
Second, India’s strategic ties with Mauritius and Seychelles hold the
key for greater maritime influence in the region.

Importance of the South West Indian Ocean to India’s
Strategic Interests
The South-West Indian Ocean, which comprises of the island nations of
Mauritius, Seychelles, and France, provides an interesting opportunity
to India to build a greater leading role, if not the supreme sphere of
influence. In addition, as the largest Indian Ocean littoral state, with a
stable democratic polity and credible maritime power, India has an
important and meaningful role in the security scenario of the region.
Islands have always played an important role in maritime strategy, but
its significance has been underappreciated in the diplomatic circles of
India until recent times. Traversing through history, we could find that
rising nations have controlled strategic islands to project power across
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vast areas of the globe. However, the end of the Cold War, development
of nationalism in these littoral island nations and the gradual
acceptance of the established international order brought down the
occupation of islands as territories of western powers.3 The mounting
significance of the island nations of this region is that India’s access to
and influence over these islands will provide strategic advantages like
longer maritime deployments, possible military infrastructure, thereby
influencing the response from the other competitors.
India has had a strong relationship with the two of littoral countries of
the region viz. Mauritius and the Seychelles. Nonetheless, the changing
geopolitical environment, China's increasing forays into the Indian
Ocean, and the Indo-French bonhomie facilitated India’s activism in
the littoral countries of the South-West Indian Ocean. As Beijing
continues to expand its presence across the maritime domain, India has
reshaped its maritime strategies to secure its national interests, more
so in the Indian Ocean Region. As with any other maritime space, the
islands of the South-West Indian Ocean region have a significant
influence in shaping the new security architecture in the region.
For India, the most crucial strategic islands in the South West are
Mauritius and the Seychelles. These islands span the ocean from India
to Africa. Their strategic importance is highlighted by their location
along key sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs). These islands are vital
to and can facilitate a navy’s continuous presence along, key
international shipping routes, allowing a navy to patrol and secure
SLOCs during peace times and an option to interdict and cut off an
adversary’s communications during times of conflict. Such presence
allows navies to project power, increasing their profile as a net security
provider. Operations from and near these four islands provide good
coverage of the south and the central Indian Ocean and thus developing
strategic relationships with these countries is vital for India’s security
and economic interests.

Change of Policy and Alignment in the National Government
Regarding the South-West Asian Region
If one analyses the timeline of India's maritime diplomatic practices,
one could easily find that the vigor and determination to protect and
enhance its maritime interests in the IOR had received a considerable
boost with the start of the 21st century. Things started changing with an
element of pragmatism aided with a neo-liberal approach replacing the
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ambiguity of Indian maritime aspirations. This was the period where
the economy showed signs of progress and the fastest growing rate
because of various structural changes brought in the previous decade.
After years of hesitation, India has done away with its inward-looking
foreign policy and has started seeing the South-West Asian region as an
important area of interest. In 2013, Manmohan Singh stated in a
speech “we (India) have also sought to assume our responsibility for
stability in the Indian Ocean Region. We are well positioned, therefore,
to become a net provider of security in our immediate region and
beyond.”4 Twenty-first century India witnessed the change of power in
administration along with the adoption of maritime strategies by the
Indian Navy. With changes of time and in global circumstances, India
has displayed more enthusiasm in protecting its legitimate rights and
aspirations in the IOR. This increasing focus is because of the
realization of the strategic advantage that India holds, being
surrounded by the ocean, which also carries 90% of its foreign trade. In
addition, the importance of developing strategic relationships with the
littoral states of the IOR has been intensified by China's increased naval
power projection in the IOR. China has expanded its strategic reach
and influence in the region by supporting various economic enterprises
in the island nations of the region. With the recognition of the necessity
to interact more actively with littoral states of the IOR in a bid to
minimize Chinese influence in the region, active maritime security
engagements have emerged as a cornerstone of India's regional foreign
policy initiatives. Thus, with the changes of time and circumstances in
the region, India has significantly reshaped its maritime strategy and
looks forward to greater involvement in the maritime affairs of the
region.

Status of India’s Maritime Influence in the South-West
Indian Ocean
With the growth and evolution of the Indian Navy, it has moved beyond
its self-demarcated maritime domains of the IN stretching from the
Red Sea to the Malacca Straits and has established crucial interests in
projecting itself as one of the major security providers in the region. In
this, along with an increasingly optimistic leadership with a growing
and robust naval force, the political will of these littoral countries
stands as an imperative in the fulfilment of India's maritime ambitions
with the littoral countries of the South-West Indian Ocean.
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Since independence, India has shown a profound interest in being a
maritime security provider throughout the southwest IOR (Indian
Ocean Region) through combating Somalia-based piracy and help in
the policing of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the island
nations. Capitalizing on the long history of bilateral trust and goodwill
with the littoral nations of the South West Indian Ocean, India has
been successful in building strategic relationships with Mauritius and
Seychelles through its security and economic partnerships and has
improved its relationship with France. India’s relationship with the
Seychelles and Mauritius presents an interesting scenario where it has
been successfully balancing the demands of major powers for using it
for military purposes while at the same time relying on India as a sort
of benign security guarantor. In recent years, France has recognized
India’s rise as an influential power in Asia and thus has taken due note
of India’s growing naval ambitions. Meanwhile, India’s desire to build a
greater leading role is challenged by France’s traditional stronghold
and the increasing American and Chinese influence into the region.
It may be noted that the United States has a permanent base in Diego
Garcia, which gives it a strategic upper hand in the maritime affairs of
the region. This strategically significant island was leased to the United
States for setting up a military base in 1966 by the UK. Diego Garcia
has served as a hub for American troops during their war against
terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, there are increasing Chinese
forays into the region where China has invested heavily in a special
economic zone in Mauritius along with other strategic investments on
the island. China plans to build a logistics and services hub in the
economic zone, together with a university and an oceanographic
research Centre.5 Thus, China’s growing relationship with Mauritius
and other Indian Ocean littoral nations threaten to dilute India’s
traditional influence in the region. This has led India to take a more
assertive approach in improving its influence and building strategic
partnerships with the littoral regions of the South-West Indian Ocean.
However, in order to understand India’s present status in the strategic
scenario of the South-West Indian Ocean, a brief review of the strategic
relationships with the principal island nations of Mauritius, the
Seychelles, and France is undertaken in the following section.
India’s Relationship with Mauritius
India’s relationship with Mauritius goes long back to colonial history
where the European colonists imported indentured labor from India to
work in its sugar cane plantations in Mauritius. However, diplomatic
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relations between India and Mauritius started in 1948, and since then
diplomatic ties have continually deepened, and today they touch
diverse areas of cooperation. After attainment of independence on
March 12, 1968, the first Prime Minister and the Father of the
Mauritian Nation Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam accorded centrality to
India in its foreign policy. With a strong population of Indian descent,
Mauritius had always favored Indian strategic interests and acts as a
key security partner in the region. India has considered Mauritius one
of its closest international partners and has acted more or less in
cooperation with the United States on issues relating to Mauritius.
After the departure of the British Royal Navy in 1974, India effectively
played an important role in protecting Mauritius’ security. India has
helped establish the Coast Guard of Mauritius for policing its EEZ and
has provided training and equipment to the security forces. 6 India’s
strategic relationship with Mauritius was further strengthened with the
assistance providing in averting numerous political coups during the
early and mid-80s.
Highlighting the bilateral trust and goodwill between India and
Mauritius is the fact that India provides the commander of the
Mauritian Coast Guard and Police Helicopter Squadron.7 The Indian
Navy has also been providing maritime security to Mauritius’ EEZ
through periodic patrols since 2003. Since 2009, Indian and Mauritius’
maritime forces are involved in jointly patrolling the Mauritian
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as Indian naval ships make regular
port calls to the nation and conduct exercises with its Coast Guard.
India has also helped Mauritius in building its National Hydrographic
Unit as well as the coastal radar system that has both economic and
strategic purposes. It may be noted that Mauritius has been able to
avoid the costs of maintaining a dedicated military force to fulfil its
security requirements and has maintained only paramilitary
capabilities. This is because of its close defense and security
relationship with India, which acts as its security guarantor that
accomplishes the strategic interests of both the nations.8
India has given several Line of Credits to Mauritius since 2010, for the
purchase of security equipment like offshore patrol vehicles, specialized
equipment and vehicles, and waterjet fast attack craft. These lines of
credit given to the country have proved to be essential for the security
of its economy as the nation is affected by non-traditional threats like
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, piracy, and the possibility
of maritime terrorism that invariably affect Mauritius and its economic
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interests. India has also installed a radar coastal surveillance system
throughout the Mauritian island chain. It includes five stations on the
islands of Mauritius and one each on Rodrigues, Saint Brandon, and
the Agalega Islands.9
Since 2006, New Delhi has been discussing with Port Louis for a longterm lease of the strategically significant Agalega islands to India
ostensibly for tourism.10 However, it has been widely speculated that
New Delhi anticipates upgrading an airstrip on North Agalega to
service Indian manned and unmanned surveillance aircraft.11 Prime
Minister Narendra Modi’s visited Mauritius in 2015, where the two
countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding to improve
cooperation on ocean economy, culture, agriculture, sea and air
transport facilities in Agalega and increase capabilities of the Mauritian
Defense Forces in safeguarding their interests that further
strengthened their partnership.12 During the visit, the Offshore Patrol
Vessel Barracuda, built by an Indian shipyard under a Government of
India Line of Credit, was also commissioned into the Mauritian
National Coast Guard.13 Since the agreement on Agalega islands, there
have been several reports anticipating Indian naval and coastguards’
interests to set up transponder systems and surveillance infrastructure,
which has led to some local protest.14 At present, the government is
closely watching a battle brewing in the Mauritius parliament over the
project. Accusing of compromising with the sovereignty of the nation,
the Opposition questioned the government over India’s involvement in
the project. They also raised issues regarding its costs and a possible
military component. Thus, the Jugnauth led government had a hard
time convincing the national assembly, further stalling the process.
Nonetheless, the $87 million project, to be funded by India, has been
awarded to two Indian companies. The Hindu, reports that surveys
have begun to fulfil the contract signed on September 2018, which
stipulated that construction begins by February 12, 2019, and be
completed in 2021.15 If this materializes, it would significantly improve
India’s air surveillance capabilities throughout the Western Indian
Ocean, including the Mozambique Channel. Brahma Chellaney, an
Indian expert on security issues, said using Agaléga as a “logistics hub”
could help Delhi “sustain naval operations in the south-west Indian
Ocean.”16
In 2017, the Mauritian Prime Minister Pravin Kumar Jugnauht chose
India as his first foreign visit where they signed four agreements, one
including an agreement on maritime security. Further, both the
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countries have agreed that effective management of conventional and
non-conventional threats in the Indian Ocean is fundamental for
pursuing economic opportunities. Both the nations agreed to cooperate
against piracy, humans and drugs trafficking as well as illegal fishing
and other forms of illegal exploitation of marine resources. India is also
supporting the National Coast Guard of Mauritius to augment its
capacity through Project Trident, an integrated development project of
the NCG. India will also renew the life of the Coast Guard Ship
Guardian, which was given to Mauritius under an assistance program.17
The Indian President visited Mauritius on March 2018 where he
announced a US$100 million new line of credit (LOC) to the nation for
the procurement of the Multipurpose Offshore Patrol Vessel along with
an additional grant component of US$5 million.18 Highlighting that
“India and Mauritius share common security concerns in the Indian
Ocean Region,” the President identified Mauritius as India’s “gateway”
to Africa as well as the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). According to
President Kovind, the two countries have a “natural convergence” of
interests and “exemplary” bilateral cooperation in maritime security
and counterterrorism. 19 Therefore, the LOC (US$100 million) meant
for another offshore patrol vehicle to be provided by India as
announced by India’s President Kovind is in line with India’s consistent
policy to strengthen the surveillance and reconnaissance capacity of the
Mauritian National Coast Guard by modernizing it further.20Thus, a
sharp increase in the quantum of the Indian LOCs to Mauritius also
highlights the significance being given to the relationship. The recent
LOC announced by President Kovind for acquiring another offshore
patrol vessel reinforces the strategic depth of the relationship between
the two countries.
India’s Strategic Ties with the Seychelles
The Seychelles archipelago, strategically located in the Indian Ocean,
has been successfully balancing the demands of major powers for using
it for military purposes while at the same time relying on India as a sort
of benign security guarantor. India-Seychelles diplomatic relationships
started soon after the independence of the Seychelles in 1976. Since
then, India and Seychelles enjoy a relationship developed on close
friendship, understanding, and cooperation. There has been a highlevel exchange of visits since Seychelles attained its independence.
India’s close relationship with the Seychelles started from the year 1982
when President Albert Rene sought India’s help to intervene in an
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attempted coup by foreign mercenaries and protect him.21 In 1986,
India’s status as a benign security guarantor to the Seychelles was
further recognized when an attempted coup against President Rene was
prevented with the help of the Indian Navy.22 Coup threats against the
Seychelles government receded by the late 1980s. Hereafter, the IndiaSeychelles security relationship focused on training the Seychelles
security forces.23 Among other things, India built the Seychelles
Defense Academy in 1989 and was largely responsible for its
management. India has also been policing the Seychelles’ EEZ under a
bilateral defense cooperation agreement signed in 2003. India also
provides training to the Seychelles Special Forces in VIP protection,
commando operations and diving. Under its defense cooperation, India
also acquired the privilege and power of supplying a maritime security
advisor and naval advisor to the Seychelles President.24 The Indian
Navy is known to conduct anti-piracy patrols and hydrographic surveys
regularly in the waters of the Seychelles. India has also started the
construction of a coastal surveillance radar system in the Seychelles.25
In June 2010, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced India’s
decision to write off almost half of Seychelles’ debt to India. This
gesture was widely seen as a strategy to bring back the Seychelles from
the growing incentives of Chinese assistance. In the months following
Prime Minister Singh’s announcement, the then Indian foreign
minister S.M. Krishna and defense minister A.K. Anthony visited the
Seychelles in July 2010. During his visit, Anthony sought to strengthen
Indo-Seychelles defense partnership by better institutionalizing the
previously ad hoc defense cooperation between the two countries.
Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi’s visited Seychelles in 2015 as part
of his three-nation trip in the IOR, which was the first Prime
Ministerial level visit to the nation in 34 years. It was a highly
successful visit with substantive outcomes, including the signing of four
Agreements/MoUs concerning Renewable Energy Cooperation,
Cooperation in the field of Hydrography; Protocol on Sale of
Navigational Charts / Electronic Navigational Charts; and Agreement
on the Development of facilities on Assumption Island. Again,
Seychelles President James Alix Michel’s visited India in Aug 2015,
when five agreements on bilateral air services, agricultural cooperation,
blue economy, tax information exchange, and gifting of a second
Dornier aircraft to Seychelles were signed.26
India and Seychelles have an elaborate architecture of defense and
security cooperation that has deepened over the years with the growing
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piracy menace and other economic offences in the strategic Indian
Ocean region. By 2010, India focused on assisting the Seychelles to
counter piracy in its neighboring waters. In pursuance of the MOU on
Hydrography signed during the Prime Minister’s visit in Mar 2015,
Indian Naval Ship INS Darshak visited Seychelles from 5 Nov to 19 Dec
2015 to conduct a hydrographic survey of Victoria Port and adjoining
areas. Two patrol boats PS Topaz and PS Constant were gifted by India
to Seychelles in 2005 and 2014 respectively. Indian Coast Guard’s Fast
Interceptor Boat C-405 (rechristened ‘PB Hermes’) was gifted to
Seychelles in 2016.27 Acting on its maritime strategy of bringing the
littoral countries under its arena, India gifted one Dornier maritime
surveillance aircraft to Seychelles in 2013 and the second promised
Dornier aircraft was delivered to Seychelles in June 2018. India gifted
and installed six coastal surveillance radar systems in Seychelles in
2015, enabling better coastal security for Seychelles.
During Seychelles, President Danny Faure’s six-day visit to India in
June 2018, India, and Seychelles agreed to work together on the project
to develop a naval base at the Assumption Island, keeping each other’s
concerns in mind. Faure remarked that the Assumption Island project
was discussed and the two countries equally agreed to work together
bearing each other’s interests.28 The significance Assumption Island is
its location in the outer group of the 115 islands that make up the
boundary of Seychelles, lying north of Madagascar. A joint military
build-up would have immensely benefitted both the nation’s geostrategic interests along with countering the growing menace of piracy
off the Mozambique coast. It may be reminded that there has been
growing political opposition in Seychelles to this agreement signed with
India. Nonetheless, India ramped up its defense partnership with the
Indian Ocean Region country by handing over a Dornier aircraft and a
USD 100-million defense related credit to Seychelles for augmenting its
defense capabilities.29 The military and naval assistance being provided
by the Indian government to Seychelles are aimed at ensuring free,
open, and inclusive Indian Ocean Region, which has been recapitulated
in its policy of Security and Growth for All in the Region. Through this
policy, the Indian government is trying to promote safe and inclusive
growth across the waters of the ocean by engaging all stakeholders and
littoral nations of the region.
The Seychelles has so far been successful in balancing the power
struggle for influence by major Indian Ocean powers like the United
States, the UAE, and China to its own advantage. However, in the light
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of India’s growing anxiety over PLAN’s access to Port Victoria for the
operational turnaround of PLAN vessels, New Delhi was assured by the
Seychelles President that India’s status, as the Seychelles’ “main
development partner” would remain non-negotiable.30 This indicates
that India has been able to safeguard its strategic partnership with
Seychelles and strengthen the relationship even with changing times.
India’s Strategic Understanding with France
France is the strongest power in and around the Mozambique Channel
where the French Department of Reunion, about 200 km off Mauritius,
is the headquarters of the French South Indian Ocean armed forces. Its
large base at Djibouti and its ownership of Antarctic territories, which
include the Kerguelen Islands, St Paul and Amsterdam Islands and the
Crozet Islands, support France’s security presence.
Historically, India has had a special regard for France for its semiautonomous strategic posture within the Western alliance. However,
concerned about growing Indian influence in the Reunion islands with
around 25 per cent of the population of Indian descent, France
hesitated to open an Indian consulate in Reunion until 1986. Thus,
there was a degree of low-level competition between India and France
for strategic influence relating to French cultural influence in Mauritius
and its physical proximity to Reunion islands.31
In addition, France was not invited to be a member of the Indian Ocean
Region- Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) during its
formation in 1997. As per the criteria of membership, only littoral
states could be part of IORA. France claim for qualification is through
its territories in the Indian Ocean. Despite the support from Australia,
South Africa, and Singapore for French membership, India refused to
bring France in the grouping fearing a potentially influential
competitor to the organization.32 In addition, the former French
colonies of Mauritius and Seychelles resisted France becoming a
member of the IORA, as it believes that their voice in the group could
be muffled.33 Therefore, France had to be content with the status of a
dialogue partner in IOR-ARC.
However, since the last decade or so, particularly after the coming to
power of the UPA government in India, the strategic relationship
between India and France has improved, with France realizing that
India will rise as an influential power in Asia and so it should be
engaged early on to shape the future strategic equations in the region.
52
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France has taken due note of India’s growing naval ambitions and has
anticipated that the Indian Navy is going to be a major force in the
Indian Ocean in the near future, and has become increasingly
comfortable with an expanded Indian maritime security presence in the
region.
France has also encouraged India’s growing role in policing the SouthWest Indian Ocean against pirates. However, while supporting India’s
rise, it has also tried to ensure that India would acknowledge its
legitimate interests in the IOR. The consolidation of India’s and
France’s strategic perspectives on the Indian Ocean was globally seen
as part of a broader pattern of Indo-French defense cooperation in the
Indian Ocean. The UPA government also invited France to be a
member of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in 2008. France has
derived great satisfaction in that it was the only Western country to be
invited by India for launching the IONS. However, as regards the
conduct of joint operations with the French Navy, the UPA government
stuck to the Indian tradition of opting out of any coalition operations
that are not under the aegis of the United Nations. As an alternative,
New Delhi is seen organizing anti-piracy operations as part of the
recent IONS. However, India has now accepted France as a net security
provider in the Indian Ocean Region. As part of its strategic
partnership in the IOR, India has sought to include France in annual
bilateral naval exercises, since 1993, which have grown in size and
complexity. Since 2001, these exercises have been termed "Varuna,"
and 18 editions of the same have been conducted until date. The 2018
edition of the Varuna naval exercise focused on submarine and antisubmarine warfare, along with building greater maritime domain
awareness.
France’s most important strategic partnership with India concerns
armament transfers, often a critical factor in its external relations.
India’s lucrative arms market has often lured defense industries the
world over. France has won a series of contracts, including the transfer
of six Scorpene submarines in 2005 and the upgrading of the Indian
aircraft fleet of Mirage 2000 in 2010.34 Since 2012, New Delhi and
Paris have worked on a new series of important orders: An agreement
to co-develop and co-produce short-range surface-to-air missiles has
reached the final phase along with the initiation of negotiations for a
US$12 billion contract for the transfer of 126 Rafale fighter jets. At
present, India had signed a government-to-government deal with
France in 2016 to buy 36 Rafale fighter jets at the cost of about Rs 580
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billion (Rs 58,000 crore).35 New Delhi’s policy of strengthening its
strategic partnership with Paris also consists of defense and technology
development.
French President Emannuel Macron’s visited India on the Indian Prime
Minister's invitation on March 2018. In a change of policy and reaching
a major breakthrough in maritime cooperation, India and France
signed an agreement to access each other’s military facilities, including
opening naval bases to warships.36 This agreement could potentially
improve the reach and deployment of Indian naval forces in the
southern Indian Ocean. In total, fourteen agreements were signed
during the visit. However, the key defense agreement signed was for the
“provision of reciprocal logistics support between their Armed
Forces.”37 The agreement echoes similarity to that signed by India with
the United States in 2016, which allowed the use of each other’s
installations for repair and replenishment of supplies by the militaries
of each country. According to the India-French joint statement, the
agreement will facilitate the reciprocal provision of logistic support,
supply, and services between the Indian and French armed forces
during authorized port visits, joint exercises, and joint training among
others.38 This agreement came in the backdrop of professed closer
cooperation in the Indian Ocean region. Prime Minister Modi
commented that both the countries believe in the potentiality of the
Indian Ocean region playing a important role in the happiness,
progress, and prosperity of the world. He reiterated that both the
nations are committed to strengthening cooperation in areas of
environment, maritime security, marine resources, and freedom of
navigation and over flight. Echoing these words, the French President
said both the countries would have "unprecedented" level of
cooperation to ensure peace and stability in the Indian and the Pacific
Ocean.39 Overall, it may be seen that France now appreciates India as a
key partner in providing logistical support for the deployment of the
French fleet and naval aviation in peacetime and a potential partner in
regional crisis prevention. In addition, India acknowledges France as a
net security provider in the Indian Ocean and intends to work with it to
promote stability in the region.

Conclusion
If we compare India’s strategic influence in the South-West Indian
Ocean, we will find that the region provides an interesting opportunity
to India to build a greater leading role, if not the supreme sphere of
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influence. India has traditional ties with most of the island states in the
South-West Indian Ocean region, owing to a sizeable population of
Indian descent and being the natural successor to most of British
Indian Ocean Territories. As such, since independence, India has taken
over the responsibility of being the net security provider of the region.
However, New Delhi’s effort to be a net security provider in the region
is restricted by the powerful American and French presence in the
region through their respective overseas territories. More so, the
growing Chinese influence in the Seychelles and Mauritius has been a
major concern in India’s strategic circles, which has threatened to
dilute India’s traditional influence in the region.
India’s recent focus to deepen ties with the island nations of the Indian
Ocean region is largely dictated by national security concerns and great
power ambitions. India’s maritime security cooperation with the littoral
nations of the region is directed at ensuring greater visibility of the
Indian flag and countering the growing Chinese naval presence in the
Indian Ocean. As the Indian navy is looking forward to continuous
deployments in seven key areas of the Indian Ocean, developing access
to and collaboration with these littoral islands has become significantly
more important for India’s strategic interests. While India has been
successful in maintaining a presence in Mauritius and Seychelles
through annual patrols and assistance in those waters, India's lack of
logistical support stands in the way of ensuring sustained presence
required for an effective mission based deployment. Nevertheless, the
recently concluded joint collaboration, such as logistics agreements
with France and the United States has the potential of slightly
overcoming the operational challenges faced in the region. In addition,
if the arrangements in Assumption Island in the Seychelles and the
Agalega Islands of Mauritius come to fruition in the near future, it
would significantly improve India’s air surveillance capabilities
throughout the Western Indian Ocean, including the Mozambique
Channel. Thus, India’s strategic partnership with Mauritius and
Seychelles holds the key for greater strategic influence in the region.
Hence, Indian efforts at building possible military infrastructure in
Seychelles and Mauritius underline New Delhi’s realization of its
challenges in operating in those waters.
India enjoys considerable goodwill among the nations of the Southwest
Indian Ocean, and so New Delhi needs to reciprocate the confidence
bestowed on the nation and be more assertive in portraying as the net
security provider of the region. The decision to expand the reach of the
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Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation between India, Sri Lanka and
the Maldives by inviting Mauritius and Seychelles in 2014 as ‘guests’ is
a welcome direction in this step. However, there has been no meeting
of national security advisors of the concerned parties since then, and
India needs to show more seriousness in including them in an
expanded maritime security construct. New Delhi’s efforts in the region
should not be in the form of reactions to Chinese inroads in the region,
but be based on a continued strategic engagement focused on economic
and security partnership. India should also continue to improve its
relationship with France that has seen major converging of interests
among them in recent times. The efforts to build a major strategic role
in the region should be more consistent than what has been evident
over the last decade or so. Thus, India's hopes of becoming a leading
security guarantor in the region depend on how it engages the littoral
island nations in a coherent regional framework and re-examining its
strategic partnership with the greater powers of the region.
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